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Performance Volatility, Information Availability, and Disclosure ReformsAuthor(s): Yong H. Kim, Fang Gao, Yong Kim, Buhui Qiu
Publication Name: Journal of Banking & Finance/Elsevier
Volume: 75, Issue: 2, Page Number(s): 35-52
Using the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley reform as an exogenous disclosure shock, we find that high, relative to low, volatility firms opt for lower levels of information availability pre reform and experience increases in information availability, CEO turnover-to-performance sensitivity, myopic behavior, CEO compensation with a structure tilted towards more cash pay, and a reduction in firm value post the reform. Our findings suggest that mandating high levels of information availability across the board increases managerial evaluation risk and produces additional agency costs for firms with volatile performance.